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NEWS &ANALYSIS 
Common Law Remedies: A Refresher 
by Denise E. Antolini and Clifford L. Rechtschaffen 
Editors 'Summary: Recent lawsuits by state and local governments, public in-
terest organizations, and private citizens against electric companies, automo-
bile companies, and lead paint manufacturers signifY the reemergence of the 
common law as a powerful tool for protecting the environment. In this Article, 
Denise E. Antolini and Clifford L. Rechtschaffen provide a broad introduction 
to various common law theories that can be used to protect the environment, in-
cluding trespass, nuisance, strict liability, and public trust. They conclude with 
a discussion of when and how environmental statutes preempt federal and state 
common law claims. 
[Editors' Note: This Article appears in the book Creative Common Law 
Strategies for Protecting the Environment edited by Clifford Rechtschaffen and 
Denise Antolini, published in 2007 by ELI Press. The book can be ordered 
either by calling ELI at 800-433-5120 or logging on to the ELI website at 
http://www.eli.org. 
I. Introduction 
Before the start of the modem environmental era approxi-
mately 35 years ago, common law remedies were the pri-
mary tool for protecting the environment. In those "old 
days," typical factual contexts for a common law pollution 
case included a hog sty, cement factory, or copper smelter. 1 
The classic confrontation in court was between a burdened 
private property owner (or, less commonly, the government) 
and the rapidly developing enterprises that were essential to 
the industrial age, but which were largely unregulated and 
frothing with externalities. 
Not only has the field of environmental law changed radi-
cally since that time, but so have the nature and complexity 
of our environmental challenges. Today, a large range of 
polluting activity has either ceased, been mitigated, or is di-
rectly regulated by federal or state statutory law. This does 
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1. See, e.g., Dubois v. Budlong, 23 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1863) (holding hog sty and slaughterhouse in New York City were 
prima facie common nuisance but refusing injunction); Madison v. 
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904) 
(requiring copper smelters causing smoke that damaged region to 
pay damages but declining injunction); Riblet v. Spokane-Portland 
Cement Co., 274 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1954) (upholding award of dam-
ages from cement plant dust as a nuisance). See also William L. 
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 
998 (1966) (providing examples of classic nuisance cases); and 
Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Par-
adox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 767-71 
(2001) (citing public nuisance examples). 
not, however, solve all environmental problems or eliminate 
the role of the common law. In fact, the areas "left behind" 
by the modem statutory era may be more stubborn, more 
subtle, and require (particularly for lawyers) even greater 
creativity and heroism to resolve. 
Yet, after a flurry of environmental legislation was 
adopted in the early 1970s, common law theories were often 
relegated to an afterthought and hardly used at all by the ris-
ing national cadre of environmental advocates and public 
interest lawyers. At the local level, however, general practi-
tioners and others not swept up in the national statutory era 
continued to use the common law as a tool in areas beyond 
the reach of statutes. Today, at the beginning of the new mil-
lennium, whether by necessity or choice, it appears that 
these old and new strategies are increasingly complemen-
tary. Recently, creative practitioners have breathed new life 
into common law approaches, seeking to fill gaps left by 
statutory and regulatory protections. As these practitioners 
have discovered and demonstrated, many common law 
tools remain vital and effective today, not just as interstitial 
or tag-on remedies, but as the best unitary solution for some 
kinds of difficult environmental challenges. 
This Article provides a refresher on the various common 
law theories that can be used to protect environmental re-
sources. These theories include trespass, public and private 
nuisance, negligence, public trust, and strict liability (both 
for products and abnormally dangerous activities). 2 We out-
2. Other common law theories applicable to environmental problems, 
but not discussed in this Article, include riparian rights, littoral 
rights, and inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Sundell v. Town of New 
London, 409 A.2d 1315 (N.H. 1979) (upholding lawsuit by littoral 
owners of lake-side lots and riparian owners along brook against 
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line the basic elements of these doctrines, and then briefly 
explore how they have been (or could be) adapted to address 
modem environmental problems. We discuss some of the 
features that make these tools well suited to dealing with 
current pollution or natural resources conflicts, as well as 
some of the obstacles (such as preemption) that presently 
limit their usefulness. The Article is not a comprehensive 
treatise on these causes of action, but rather lays a basic 
groundwork and serves as a research tool for ourreaders' fu-
ture reference. 
One more preliminary observation about the inherent 
contrast between statutory and environmental law is worth 
noting. By its nature, the common law is an incremental and 
evolutionary source of law, not necessarily the quickest or 
broadest solution for social ills, but perfectly suited for per-
petuity. The common law's virtuoso Justice Oliver Holmes 
saw the common law as a synthesis of social-political his-
tory and judicial "legislation."3 Although it is inherently re-
active, judge-made law is developed in specific factual set-
tings, case-by-case, site-by-site, and often with the wisdom 
of community juries. It is a type of law that is flexible and 
localized-well suited for certain kinds of context-specific 
challenges. In contrast, the modem administrative law era 
that began in the 1950s and culminated in the wealth of 
keystone federal environmental statutes of the 1970s, ap-
proached environmental law problems with a national or 
regional perspective, with noncontextual rules, and with a 
proactive purpose. The U.S. Congress responded to envi-
ronmental problems with a much different role, agenda, 
and method than did individual judges for the prior hun-
dreds of years. Thus, even if aimed at the same general en-
vironmental goal, statutory and common law are, in many 
ways, not commensurable. The gauntlet thrown down for 
the common law today is not to substitute for statutory law, 
or vice versa, but to remain a robust and complementary 
remedy for problems not addressed by the now-familiar 
statutory scheme. 
II. Trespass: Torts Beyond Boundaries 
The tort of trespass to land and its ancient twin, the tort of 
nuisance, are the oldest ofthe common law theories that ex-
tend readily to environmental problems. The traditional def-
inition oftrespass is "one who intentionally enters or causes 
direct and tangible entry upon the land in possession of an-
other.,,4 The trespasser is then liab 1 e for the harm that results, 
town over wastewater discharge into tributary oflake that caused in-
crease in algae and reduced recreational opportunities, under private 
nuisance, riparian rights, littoral rights, and inverse condemnation 
theories). See also WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: AIR AND WATER §2.17 (Inverse Condemnation) and §2.19 
(Riparian Rights) (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§849(2) (1979) (pollution by riparian owner not a riparian right). 
3. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 
1923) (1881). 
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never 
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles 
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from his-
tory at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or 
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it 
ceases to grow. 
Id. at 36. 
4. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 95 (2000) (internal foot-
notes omitted). 
even if that harm is not physical, because the essential right 
violated is exclusive possession.5 Trespass is an intentional 
tort, which has implications both for the burden of proof on a 
plaintiff and the possibly richer damages available. For this 
reason, and the weight ofhistory, courts usually strictly con-
strue its contours. 
In the environmental context, a key issue in a trespass ac-
tion is whether an appropriate "object" has indeed entered 
plaintiff's property. Traditionally, the thing has to be "tangi-
ble'" that is visible-such as shrapnel from a bullet, a utility 
line, or an arm6-and it must have caused "direct" interfer-
ence.7 Some modem cases have loosened up on the direct-
ness requirement. 8 And, as scientific knowledge developed, 
the courts were faced with hard questions of whether light, 
microscopic dust, vibration, and smoke were in the nature 
of a trespass or were, instead, a nuisance, i.e., interfering 
with use and enjoyment more than with the right to exclu-
sive possession.9 
Many courts have been unwilling to extend trespass in 
this direction because it would "produce too much liabil-
ity."lO For example, smoke blowing across the plaintiff's 
land may be treated as a nuisance rather than the stricter tort 
of trespass. Some courts may be more comfortable with the 
reasonableness standard of nuisance in resolving disputes 
that involve less than serious or substantial invasions. 11 
Yet, trespass can stretch to cover modem air pollution 
problems. If the entry of particles is discemable and causes 
actual harm, a trespass action might succeed. 12 For the 
plaintiff, the advantage of trespass in these cases is that the 
defendant cannot argue that the invasion was "reasonable" 
(an argument that would be allowed in a nuisance case). In 
addition, the defendant's intent may set up a punitive dam-
ages claim. 13 On the other hand, if an invasion is character-
5. Id. at 95-96. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS §158 (Lia-
bility for Intentional Intrusions on Land) and § 163 (Intended Intru-
sions Causing No Harm) (1965). 
6. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 108 (citing examples). 
7. See id. at 104. 
8. Id. at 104-05. See also, e.g., Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. 
Co., 709 P.2d 782,790, 16 ELR 20346 (Wash. 1985) (rejecting 
the distinction between direct and indirect invasions, and com-
menting: "We also should recognize the fallacy of clinging to out-
moded doctrines."). 
9. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847, 850 
(Or. 1948) (finding that light from horse racing track that damaged 
drive-in movie business was not a trespass, and noting that the "di-
viding line between trespass and nuisance is not always a sharp 
one"); cf Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) 
(finding invisible fluoride particulates and gases from aluminum 
production constituted trespass); Bradley, 709 P.2d at 782 (finding 
that deposit of microscopic particles from a copper smelter could 
constitute both trespass and nuisance). William Prosser notes that 
some courts have extended trespass to "the entry of invisible gases 
and microscopic particles, but only if harm results," suggesting 
that they are not true trespass cases. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 71 (5th ed. 1984) (internal foot-
note omitted). 
10. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 105. 
11. Id. 
12. See, e.g., Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1992) (holding smoke 
from burning field of grass stubble constituted trespass despite de-
fendant's permit from the state environmental quality agency); 
Bradley, 709 P.2d at 782. 
13. See, e.g., Tyler v. Lincoln, 527 S.E.2d 180 (Ga. 2000) (allowing pu-
nitive damages from trespass of sediment and excess stormwater 
from subdivision development into plaintiffs' cypress ponds). 
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ized as a trespass, then something that is "utterly trifling" 
may be seen as falling below the trespass threshold. 14 
The issue of intent in trespass is less daunting for plain-
tiffs than it first seems. A defendant need have intended only 
to enter or to cause the entry, not necessarily to harm. IS Even 
mistaken trespassers are liable. 16 The substantial certainty 
standard applies as well, allowing a broader sweep to the in-
tent element. 17 However, if the defendant can show the tres-
pass was merely negligent, accidental, or not of his or her 
own actions, then intent is not met. (Such a case can, none-
theless, still be brought as a negligence action but it is out-
side the realm of trespass.) For example, "[i]f the defen-
dant's dam breaks, causing downstream flooding, the defen-
dant may be liable for trespass if he intentionally caused 
the waters to enter the plaintiff's property," with nuisance 
or negligence theories waiting in the wings if intent cannot 
be shown. 18 
The interests protected by the tort include not only the 
right to exclusive possession but also the physical integrity 
ofthe land. As Prof. Dan Dobbs explains, this is "the rightto 
prevent others from doing physical harm to or taking any 
part of the land such as trees or minerals." 19 In addition, the 
tort protects, to some extent, the airspace above plaintiff's 
land.20 One intriguing potential application of trespass law 
is to the noise and annoyance caused by aircraft flights. Un-
der the traditional view, the landowner owned "up to the 
heavens," yet that metaphor has found limits in the law. 
While very low overflights can obviously interfere with 
possession, higher flights have produced a volatile line in 
the case law.21 Conversely, trespass does protect a land-
owner against subsurface intrusions onto her land.22 
F or plaintiffs, trespass offers strong remedies. A court can 
order the full range of damages (nominal, compensatory, 
and possibly punitive for intentional conduct) and, for 
14. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 107. 
15. Id. at 99. 
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 74. 
17. See Bradley, 709 P.2d at 785 (upholding trespass action resulting 
from deposit of ASARCO smelter's "microscopic particles" of 
heavy metals blown onto plaintiffs' land on Vashon Island, four 
miles away, and relying on the Restatement's standard of substantial 
certainty: "Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are 
desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or sub-
stantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is 
treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. "). 
18. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 106. Environmental cases in which the 
courts rejected trespass but left open nuisance and negligence claims 
include the following: Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 153 So. 616 
(Ala. 1934) (holding that an underground leak of gasoline was not 
trespass because invasion was indirect); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Saw-
yers, 259 S.w.2d 466 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (holding that oil and salt 
pollution of underground waters was either negligence or nuisance); 
Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that 
there was no trespass for gasoline storage tank leaks). 
19. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 102. 
20. Natural intrusions such as tree limbs are usually treated as a nuisance 
not a trespass. Id. at 108. 
21. Id. at 109 & n.13. Professor Dobbs advocates treating such cases un-
der nuisance law because it can better balance the conflicting uses 
and policies. Id. While trespass might bar all flights, nuisance would 
attempt to strike a balance and, perhaps, limit the flights over the 
plaintiff's land. Id. at 110. See Atkinson v. Bernard, 355 P.2d 229 
(Or. 1960) (finding nuisance rather than trespass applied in airport 
overflight noise case and provided more flexibility in remedy). 
22. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 110 & n.1. See, e.g., Cassinos v. Union Oil 
Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding 
lower court finding that off-site injection of wastewater from oil 
wells onto plaintiff's mineral estate constituted trespass). 
threatened or continuing harm, an injunction.23 Defendant 
can be liable not only for nominal damages for the intrusion 
itself, but potentially also for: (1) rental value of the time of 
occupation; (2) gains from occupation; (3) harm to the land, 
people, or things on the land; (4) injury to the landowner's 
interests (measured by diminution in value or by reasonable 
costs of making repairs or restoration); (5) emotional 
distress24; and (6) punitive damages. 25 In the environmental 
context, the court may award restoration damages even 
where the costs exceed the loss in land value. For example, 
in a Florida case where an air compressor company pur-
chased the highly toxic solvent perchloroethylene and then 
disposed of the waste "by illegally dumping it onto the 
ground at the rear of their facility," which then reached a 
municipal well field, the appellate court upheld the damages 
award of approximately $9 million based on the costs of res-
toration.26 Thus, in trespass, the defendant may be liable for 
losses "far beyond those normally imposed" under a neg Ii -
gence the ory. 27 
The courts have not been consistent in approaching the 
question of assessing damages for temporary, continuing, 
and permanent trespass.28 For permanent trespass, courts 
"assess all future damages in the one lawsuit.,,29 In effect, 
this is a forced sale ofland to defendant, a version of private 
eminent domain and not favored. 30 If the injury is tempo-
rary, then the plaintiff can recover for intrusions up to the 
trial, but not for future harm-leaving defendant open to a 
renewed lawsuit and providing an incentive to cease the of-
fensive conduct.31 
In summary, if the plaintiff can fit the defendant's intru-
sion into the rather tight framework of trespass, the potential 
remedies may be powerful. The number of post-1970 cases 
in the environmental area cited as examples in this section 
indicates that this ancient cause of action is still worthy of 
evaluation, and still frequently used, when the pollution 
physically crosses property boundaries. 
III. Nuisance-Private and Public-Oldies but 
Goodies 
The old nuisance cousins-private and public-are the true 
ancestors of environmental law. Nuisance is based on the 
well-accepted Anglo-American notion that private prop-
23. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 112. See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant v. 
Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (upholding permanent injunction against gun club in favor of 
neighbors to restrain repeated threatened trespass of bullets and 
shotgun pellets). 
24. In the environmental context, see, e.g., McGregor v. Barton Sand & 
Gravel, Inc., 660 P.2d 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing emotional 
distress damages where spillage of pond water from gravel mining 
pits onto plaintiffs' land occurred over a long period of time and con-
stituted intentional trespass); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1980) (upholding emotional distress claim for husband and 
wife where clouds of cement dust and fumes from plant prevented 
plaintiffs from going outdoors). 
25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
26. Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray Beach, 639 So. 2d 595, 24 
ELR 21078 (Fla. 1994). 
27. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass §130 (1991). 
28. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 115. 
29. Id. at 115. 
30. Id. at 115-16. 
31. See id. See also KEETON ET AL. supra note 9, at 84 (discussing con-
flict in case law on this point). 
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erty, while of utmost value, should nonetheless not be used 
in a manner that creates unreasonable risks outside its 
boundaries, to neighbors or to the public at large.32 The 
property rights bundle of sticks does not include the right to 
create harmful externalities: "A landowner cannot reason-
ably expect to put property to a use that constitutes a nui-
sance, even if that is the only economically viable use for 
the property."33 
Although the two types of nuisance share many features, 
they have different historic roots, and there are very impor-
tant distinctions between them, not only in terms of "who 
can sue," but also in terms of prima facie elements and de-
fenses. 34 In general, because of the often direct and more 
identifiable injury to nearby private property, private nui-
sance is typically a more successful claim for plaintiffs, 
even if the remedy may be narrowly confined geographi-
cally. Successful private nuisance plaintiffs are relatively 
plentiful. However, while the potential scope of a public 
nuisance remedy is much broader and can approach the 
breadth of a statutory remedy for a particular site, it is much 
more difficult both for individual and group plaintiffs to 
overcome initial obstacles to bringing the lawsuit (such as 
the problematic different-in-kind rule) and, often, to prove 
the causation and extent of the more widespread injury. Un-
fortunately, there are not many successful reported public 
nuisance cases with private plaintiffs that can serve as 
guideposts for practitioners. This collection of cases should 
nonetheless be fully mined for ideas because the case theory 
has a powerful scope.35 Government plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, have the upper hand in public nuisance cases. Their 
role as the modem-day king stepping in to eliminate public 
nuisances harkens back to the roots of the tort, and they usu-
ally have very good odds of winning such claims. Several of 
the case studies in this book illustrate just how broad and po-
tent public nuisance cases can be. 
As a creature primarily of state common law, nuisance is 
also a tort that is as elusive as it is ubiquitous in the environ-
mental context. The factual situations addressed in such 
cases are as varied as human life, covering environmental 
problems as diverse as the pollution of a stream by manure36 
and the noise generated by a Chinese theater during the late 
32. See 61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control §1966 (2004): 
Therefore, any business, although in itselflawful, which im-
pregnates large volumes of the atmosphere with disagree-
able, unwholesome, or offensive matter may become a nui-
sance to those occupying adjacent property, when the atmo-
sphere is contaminated to such an extent as substantially to 
impair the comfort or enjoyment of the adjacent occupants, or 
to injure vegetation, trees, or buildings. 
(Footnotes omitted.) See also State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 
(Colo. 1994) (denying takings claim in a uranium mine contamina-
tion case, and finding that nuisance uses of property were "never part 
of the bundle ofrights" of a property owner), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1159 (1995). 
33. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025,1031-32 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
34. See61C AM. JUR. 2DPollution Control §2036 (2004) ("Thecharac-
terization of a nuisance as either public or private may affect the 
availability of defenses based upon 'coming to the nuisance,' the 
statute of limitations, the acquisition of a prescriptive right, or public 
authorization.") (internal footnotes omitted). 
35. See infra notes 71-93 and accompanying text. 
36. See, e.g., People ex reI. Ricks Water Co. v. Elk River Mill & Lumber 
Co., 40 P. 486 (1895) (finding that manure from stable and hog pen 
polluted stream and constituted nuisance). 
1800s in Honolulu.37 The variation in fact patterns can be 
frustrating to practitioners seeking threads of precedent. 
Viewed together as a mosaic, however, the nuisance cases 
create a rich body of common law that has at its core a well-
established set of principles that are just as alive today as a 
century ago. 
One of those core principles that helps plaintiffs is that 
nuisance focuses the judicial process on the plaintiff's inju-
ries rather than on the defendant's conduct. For private nui-
sance' the focus is on the plaintiff property owner's inter-
ests; for public nuisance, it is on the public health, safety, 
and welfare. Therefore, the motive of the defendant, wheth-
er defendant's operation is lawful, and the due care (or lack 
of) exercised in the activity are, technically, not relevant. 38 
There are, however, many cases where statutes, zoning ordi-
nances' or permits have "legalized" a nuisance and barred a 
lawsuit39 (which itself can raise constitutional takings is-
sues).40 Many cases are to the contrary.41 This potential 
trumping of nuisance by statutory law may be the largest 
modem intrusion into traditional common law remedies.42 
37. Cluneyv. Lee Wai, 10 Haw. 319,323 (Haw. 1896) (allowinginjunc-
tion in favor of nearby resident against a Chinese musical theater that 
featured military dramas "whose noise would disturb the complain-
ant in the enjoyment of his quiet and resC). 
38. See, e.g., Iverson v. Vint, 54 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1952) (finding de-
fendant liable in nuisance for dumping of spoiled molasses in ditch 
near plaintiffs house that resulted in well contamination, even if 
such act was customary and without intent to injure); Saadeh v. 
Stanton Rowing Found., 912 So. 2d28, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(finding, in a case involving a neighbor's claim against a college pre-
paratory school's boathouse on the Arlington River, that "mere com-
pliance with the zoning ordinance will not, in and of itself, absolve a 
property owner from any claim of nuisance"). 
39. See, e.g., Kuper v. Lincoln-Union Elec. Co., 557 N.W.2d 748 (S.D. 
1996) (finding that rural electric cooperative was statutorily pro-
tected from nuisance suit arising from stray voltage on dairy farm-
ers' lands); Pure Air & Water Inc. of Chemung County v. Davidsen, 
668 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that New York's 
right to farm law shielded hog operation from private nuisance law-
suit); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that authorized hog farming operation 
cannot be a nuisance). For an extensive discussion of the implica-
tions for plaintiffs of right-to-farm laws, see Andrew C. Hanson, 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and the Common Law: 
Fixing Wrongs Committed Under the Right-to-Farm, in CREATIVE 
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
287 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds. 2007). See also 
Hager v. Waste Tech. Indus., 2002 Ohio 3466 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(finding that operation of waste incineration plant was authorized, 
and, therefore, its mere existence could not be a nuisance); Brown v. 
County Comm'rs of Scioto County, 622N.E.2d 1153 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993) (finding that because a pollution control facility operates un-
der the sanction oflaw, it cannot be a common law public nuisance, 
and that although it would be a nuisance at common law, conduct 
which is fully authorized by statute or administrative regulation is 
not an actionable tort, especially where a comprehensive set oflegis-
lative acts or administrative regulations governing the details on par-
ticular kind of conduct exists). 
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 632-33 ("authorizing someone to 
commit a private nuisance can be an authorization to take prop-
erty unconstitutionally"). 
41. Id. at 633 ("Most courts hold that zoning ordinances do not protect 
the defendant from a claim by a particular plaintiff that the defen-
dant's use is an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
mentby the plaintiff of his property."). See, e.g., Wendingerv. Forst 
Farms, Inc., 662 N.w.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a 
concentrated pig farm operation in an agriculture-zoned area is not 
entitled to an automatic defense to a nuisance claim); Flo-Sun Inc. v. 
Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (finding that a sugar cane 
operation could legally constitute a nuisance even if it complied with 
state pollution laws). 
42. This issue is a complex one requiring a close reading of the statute at 
issue. See RODGERS, supra note 2, at 96-97 (discussing the "far-
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Conversely, the common law has considerable room to 
roam in areas of pollution that are poorly addressed in mod-
em statutes, such as odor, e.g., from a sewage treatment 
plant,43 vibration,44 light, e.g., from a race-track,45 and 
noise, e.g., from air conditioning units.46 
The simultaneous curse and promise of the two kinds of 
nuisance are also revealed in the potential damages and es-
pecially the flexibility of the equitable remedy. The reme-
dies available for nuisance include compensatory damages, 
punitive damages, and injunctive relief.47 In determining the 
relief, "the courts have to some extent considered the rela-
tive impact of abatement or continued operation upon the 
two properties, although in other cases consideration of this 
factor has been rej ected. Courts have also weighed the social 
utility represented by the plant's operation in some in-
stances, but have declined to do so in others.,,48 From the 
watermark case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. ,49 where 
the court granted "permanent damages" that allowed a pol-
luting cement plant to continue operations, to cases where 
courts have boldly shut down offending operations,50 the 
law is rich in examples of the range of judicial choices in 
balancing outcomes. 
reaching" legislative limitations on traditional nuisance law, but not-
ing that "[ w ]hile generalities are dangerous and always subject to the 
specifics of the legislation, it can be said that the courts are reluctant 
to embrace the concept of legalized nuisance"). 
43. Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321 (R.!. 1995) (upholding trial 
court findings that municipal sewage pump station constituted a pri-
vate nuisance because of odor, noise, and vibration). 
44. Prairie Hills Water & Dev. Co. v. Gross, 653 N.W.2d 745 (S.D. 
2002) (upholding trial court judgment that a commercial sandblast-
ing business in a residential neighborhood, which created vibration, 
noise, dust, and traffic, created a public nuisance. 
45. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948) 
(finding that light from horse racing track that damaged drive-in 
movie business was not a trespass). See also Prah v. Maretti, 108 
Wis. 2d 223,12 ELR 21125 (Wis. 1982) (allowing private nuisance 
claim by owner of a solar-heated residence for the obstruction of so-
lar access by an adjoining landowner). 
46. Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1973) (upholding injunction against noisy air conditioning unit of 
neighboring apartment complex as a nuisance); see also Gruber v. 
Dodge, 205 N.w.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (enjoining defen-
dant's use of ranch land for airstrip that grew from personal to small 
commercial use, which disturbed adjoining cattle rancher through 
noise and vibrations, even though new use was permitted by federal 
and state authorities); Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922 
(Cal. 1982) (holding that emission of sound waves alone, without 
damage to property, while not sufficient to maintain an action in tres-
pass, could support a possible nuisance action). 
47. For further discussion, see DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1338-42 
(§468 Remedies). 
48. 61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control §2044 (2004) (internal foot-
notes omitted). 
49. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (issuing an injunction against defen-
dant's cement plant conditioned on payment of permanent damages 
where investment in plant exceeded $45 million and employed over 
300 people), on remand, 340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) 
(finding permanent damage to 283-acre dairy farm was $175,000), 
aff'd, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (upholding award 
of permanent damages as not excessi ve). For a discussion ofthe im-
portance of Boomer, see Symposium on Nuisance Law: Twenty 
Years After Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 54 ALB. L. REV. 171 
(1990). 
50. See, e.g., Scott v. Jordan, 661 P.2d 59,64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (ac-
knowledging that an injunction was an "extraordinary remedy," but 
upholding lower court's permanent injunction of cattle feeding oper-
ation with up to 1,200 cattle due to noxious odors, flies, and dust, and 
finding monetary damages would be inadequate compensation for 
the continuing nuisance to neighboring plaintiffs). 
Given this background, we now discuss some specific 
features of private and public nuisance, including their ap-
plication in post-1970s environmental pollution cases. 
A. Private Nuisance 
Private nuisance offers a powerful remedy for plaintiffs who 
are private property owners. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts defines private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion 
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
land."51 The basic elements of private nuisance are that 
(1) defendant's conduct is a legal cause ofthe invasion, and 
(2) "the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, 
or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable" as negli-
gence, recklessness, or an "abnormally dangerous condi-
tion[?] or activit [y]."52 "Unreasonable" is defined by the Re-
statement §826 as a situation where "(a) the gravity of the 
harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct."53 
For private nuisance, there must be an actual or threat-
ened invasion ofthe plaintiff's property, but (unlike for pub-
lic nuisance) the extent of that invasion need not always be 
substantial. "To entitle adj oining property owners to recover 
damages for the maintenance of a nuisance, it is not neces-
sary that they should be driven from their dwellings, or that 
the defendant's acts create a positively unhealthy condition; 
it is enough that their enjoyment oflife and property is ren-
dered uncomfortable" for a person of ordinary sensibili-
ties.54 In some cases, "discomfort and annoyance may con-
stitute a nuisance."55 On the other hand, the test leaves wide 
discretion to the court. 56 
Who can bring a private nuisance action? In general, the 
right extends to adj acent or nearby property owners. In order 
to recover for an injury to property, the plaintiff must have 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821D (1979). For a compre-
hensive collection of private nuisance cases, see Tracy A. Bateman, 
Nuisance as Entitling Owner or Occupier of Real Estate for Per-
sonal Inconvenience, Discomfort, Annoyance, Anguish, or Sickness, 
Distinct From, or in Addition to, Damages for Depreciation in Value 
of Property for Its Use, 25 A.L.R. 5th 568 (1994). 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §822 (1979). 
53. The Restatement's additional definition under §826(b), adopted in 
1970, that considers the feasibility of continued operations in light of 
the financial burden of compensation, i.e., requiring compensation 
even for activities deemed reasonable, has not been broadly ac-
cepted. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 701 P.2d 
222, 227-28 (Idaho 1985) (refusing to adopt §826(b) and noting a 
"plethora" of cases in accord with the more traditional view that re-
quires balancing). 
54. 61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control §2043 (2004) (internal foot-
notes omitted). 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., Arnoldt v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 
1991). 
[T]he existence of a nuisance must be ascertained on the basis 
of two broad factors, neither of which may in any case be the 
sole test to the exclusion of the other: (1) the reasonableness 
of the defendant's use of his property, and (2) the gravity of 
harm to the complainant. Both are to be considered in the 
light of all the circumstances of the case, including [1] the 
lawful nature and location ofthe defendant's business; [2] the 
manner of its operation; [3] such importance to the commu-
nity as it may have; [4] the kind, volume, time and duration of 
the particular annoyance; [5] the respective situations of the 
parties; and [6] the character (including applicable zoning) of 
the locality. 
Id. at 800 (quoting Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 
186-87 (Ky. 1960)). 
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an interest therein, although the interest need not be in fee, 
nor is it necessary that the property be occupied. 57 
Even though private nuisance claims involving pollution 
have decreased since the adoption of environmental stat-
utes, and although sometimes such claims are merely tagged 
onto the end of a statutory complaint without much enthusi-
asm,58 there are still numerous modem cases where this 
common law claim took center stage and succeeded. A snap-
shot of several post-1970 air and water pollution cases illus-
trates how these actions fill gaps in the federal and state 
clean air and clean water laws and also provide a direct rem-
edy that can be stronger than likely statutory relief.59 
For example, in 1974, the Iowa Supreme Court strongly 
endorsed injunctive relief in favor of a group of private resi-
dentiallandowners who had sued a commercial ready-mix 
plant that caused fugitive emissions, excessive noise, and 
diesel odors during its unloading and loading processes. Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs (who sought only injunctive relief 
and not damages), 60 the cement dust covered their lawns and 
plants, outdoor furniture, clotheslines, and penetrated inside 
to sills, furniture, carpets, and drapes.61 A few months later, 
the same court upheld a jury's award of permanent damages 
sought by adj acent private property owners against a munic-
ipality for odors from a sewage lagoon. The court found that 
the lagoons constituted a nuisance in fact by injuring plain-
tiffs' health, well-being, and property value.62 Similarly, in 
1975, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a lower court's 
injunction against a motorcycle race track where the dust 
and noise disturbed the local residents, but denied an injunc-
tion for automobile racing on the same track pending further 
proof of nuisance.63 
On the other hand, in an unusual private nuisance case 
involving over 200 plaintiffs from West Virginia suing a 
major oil company with a refinery in Kentucky, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court overturned a $10.3 million dam-
ages verdict, which included $9 million in punitive dam-
57. See, e.g., Schneider Nat'! Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 
(Tex. 2004) (finding tenants had right to assert private nuisance 
claim against businesses near the Houston Ship Canal that created air 
pollution, odors, light, and noise); cf Arnoldt, 412 S.E.2d at 804 
(holding that adult children as well as other non-owners residing 
with relatives do not have sufficient ownership orpossessory interest 
to bring a private nuisance action). 
58. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. Department of 
the Army, 935 F. Supp. 1206, 1220 nA, 27 ELR 20022 (D. Utah 
1996) (noting that plaintiffs "failed to specify" how the emissions 
from the U.S. Army's chemical weapons incinerator would affect 
the individual plaintiffs' interest in land), aff'd, 111 F.3d 1485, 27 
ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997). Because statutory and common law 
claims involve such different types of strategies, law, proof, and 
lawyering, they do not automatically mix well in federal environ-
mental cases. With more forethought, however, they could be a 
powerful combination. 
59. For examples of cases regarding other less traditional types of pollu-
tion, such as sound, noise, and light, see supra notes 43-46 and ac-
companying text. 
60. Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.w.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 
1974). 
61. Id. 
62. Hartzler v. Town of Kalona, 218 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1974). 
63. Bakerv. Odom, 529 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1975). See also Davis v. Izaak 
Walton League of Am., 717 P.2d 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding 
that evidence supported a finding that fugitive dust from the access 
road to a shooting range operated by the league constituted a pub-
lic nuisance. 
ages, because Kentucky law required proof of diminished 
property value.64 
Hog farms have been a favorite target of private nuisance 
lawsuits. An Oregon pig farm that produced noise, unpleas-
ant odor, and a substantial increase in the number of large 
flies in a rural residential neighborhood constituted a nui-
sance, which warranted the entry of a permanent injunc-
tion.65 Large chicken farms have been held to be private nui-
sances toO.66 
Contamination of groundwater is another area where pri-
vate nuisance theory continues to succeed. In a 1987 Mary-
land case, a court allowed the plaintiff landowners to re-
cover damages resulting from a nearby service station's 
leaking underground storage tank based on a private nui-
sance theory, even absent direct evidence of physical im-
pact.67 In 1998, a Washington State court found that even 
lawful operation of a business-a pulp mill operating with a 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act national pollution dis-
charge elimination system (NPDES) permit allowing it to 
discharge treated process wastewater into the Columbia 
River-could support an award of$2.5 million in damages 
for nuisance to potato farmers drawing irrigation water from 
the aquifer contaminated by the defendant's operation.68 
B. Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance offers a community-oriented remedy when 
the defendant's polluting externalities affect the broader 
neighborhood, not just the nearby private property owners. 
Although compared to private nuisance, public nuisance is 
much harder to bring at the front end (that is, to meet the re-
strictions on who can sue and to prove the higher level of in-
terference required), the potential back -end remedy (such as 
a broad injunction) can be very potent and approach the 
power of a statutory injunction. 
Public nuisance occurs when, apart from any injuries to 
private property that may result from the defendant's activ-
ity, there is a "substantial and unreasonable interference 
with a right held in common by the general public, in use of 
public facilities, [or] in health, safety, and convenience.,,69 
64. Arnoldtv. Ashland Oil, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 795,800 (W. Va. 1991). 
65. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enter., Inc., 575 P.2d 164 (Or. 1978). 
66. Patz v. Farmegg Prod., Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1972) 
(finding that a four-acre facility housing some 80,000 chickens that 
produced odors so strong that plaintiffs complained of extreme nau-
sea, gagging, and vomiting was "not incidental to rural life" and con-
stituted a private nuisance). See also Hobbs v. Smith, 484 P.2d 804 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd, 493 P.2d 1352, 2 ELR 20380 (Colo. 
1972) (keeping of horses, even if in compliance with zoning laws, 
was nuisance because of flies). 
67. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 5l6A.2d990, 1003-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1986) (finding that contamination resulted in the imposition of 
"crippling restrictions" on the use of plaintiffs' land, including a pro-
hibition on the use of groundwater, the building of homes, and the 
sale of land at even a reduced price). 
68. Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877,883 (Wash. 1998). "The fact a govern-
mental authority tolerates a nuisance is not a defense if the nuisance 
injures adjoining property." Id. at 884. See also id. at 890 (Talmadge, 
J., concurring) ("Boise Cascade cannot transform its NPDES permit, 
allowing pollutants into surface waters, into a generalized permit to 
pollute the groundwater or any and all other waters in the vicinity of 
its treatment facilities."); see also Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 
P.2d 803 (Wash. 1984) (finding that bypassing of raw sewage into 
river constituted private nuisance even if allowed by the State De-
partment of Ecology). 
69. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1334 (emphasis added). 
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Section 82IB of the Restatement defines unreasonable in-
terference to include: 
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interfer-
ence with the public health, the public safety, the public 
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordi-
nance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the 
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a per-
manent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or 
has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the pub-
lic right. 70 
Defendant's conduct can be either intentional or negli-
gent. 71 So long as the right affected is a public one, the num-
ber of people affected is not necessarily a limitation im-
posed by the courtS.72 The interference need not be related to 
land, but can be much broader, affecting virtually any public 
resource or place.73 Public nuisances can be "per se" or "in 
fact."74 The interference, however, must be "substantial" 
and not triviaU5 
The remedies available for public nuisance are compen-
satory damages, punitive damages, a "compensated injunc-
tion,"76 and injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is allowed 
when damages are inadequate and will be "tailored nar-
rowly to fit the nuisance.'>77 For governmental plaintiffs, 
public nuisances can be prosecuted as crimes78 or declared 
unlawful by ordinance or statute under the police power.79 
Even today, governmental entities continue to bring both 
criminal and civil public nuisance cases to supplement their 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B (1979). 
71. See Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mutual Ins. Co., 646 
N.w.2d 777,792 (Wis. 2002). 
72. Id. at 789: 
The number of people affected does not strictly define a pub-
lic nuisance .... [TJhe court considers many factors, includ-
ing, among others, the nature of the activity, the reasonable-
ness ofthe use ofthe property, location of the activity, and the 
degree or character of the injury inflicted or right impinged 
upon. (footnote omitted)). 
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B cmt. b (1979). 
74. City of Sunland Park v. Harris News, Inc., 124 P.3d 566 (N.M. Ct. 
App.2005): 
New Mexico common law more specifically defines public 
nuisance as either nuisances per se or nuisances in fact. A nui-
sance per se is "an activity, or an act, structure, instrument, or 
occupation which is a nuisance at all times and under any cir-
cumstances, regardless oflocation or surroundings." [AJ nui-
sance in fact is described as "an activity or structure which is 
not a nuisance by nature, but which becomes so because of 
such factors as surroundings, locality, and the manner in 
which it is conducted or managed." 
Id. at 577 (citations omitted). 
75. See, e.g., Breeding ex reI. Breeding v. Hensley, 519 S.E.2d 369,372 
(Va. 1999) ("More than sporadic or isolated conditions must be 
shown; the interference must be 'substantial. ''') (citation omitted). 
76. The unusual idea of a compensated injunction comes from Spur 
Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), 
where the private housing developer was granted an injunction under 
a public nuisance claim against a feed lot on the condition that the de-
veloper paid the costs of relocation. 
77. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1338. 
78. For a brief history of public nuisance law, see Antolini, supra note 1, 
at 767-71. 
79. See Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh, 879 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 2004) ("The legislature has broad discretion to declare a partic-
ular activity to be a public nuisance and enact legislation to abate the 
same in the exercise of its police power."). 
statutory authorities. 8o On the other hand, private parties' 
ability to use public nuisance has long been restricted by 
the "special injury rule," which requires that the plaintiff 
show special injury that is different in kind and not just de-
gree from that of the general public.81 Although the Re-
statement and some commentators find this restriction to 
be archaic, almost all courts continue to follow this conser-
vative approach. 82 When private parties can show such 
common law "standing," however, they then have a potent 
quasi -attorney general avenue for redressing broad harm 
to the public interests. 83 
In numerous post-I970s cases, courts have found a wide 
variety of environmental harms to be public nuisances, in-
cluding the following: contamination of subterranean 
waters84; noise from an automobile racetrack85; an unsani-
tarymobile home park86; obnoxious garbage odors87; quarry 
blasting88; common cesspools89; fumes from an asphalt stor-
age facility90; release of hazardous chemicals into the 
environment91 ; emission of hydrogen sulfide gases and 
80. See, e.g., the public nuisance case brought by several states for 
global warming, discussed in Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: 
The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRAT-
EGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 39, at 107. 
See also Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1996), and Aztec Minerals Corp. v. State, 987 P.2d 895 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1999) (finding that state was acting under its public nui-
sance authority in ordering remediation of pollution from a gold 
mine; landowner was not entitled to pollute a stream that was part of 
the headwaters of the Rio Grande River, even if the gold mine was 
the only economically viable use of the property). For a thorough 
discussion of governmental-plaintiff public nuisance cases, see Lou-
ise Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the 
Common Law (Part /), 16 ELR 10292 (Oct. 1986) and Louise 
Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Ownership, Use, and 
Causation (Part II), 17 ELR 10044 (Feb. 1987). 
81. See Antolini, supra note 1, passim. 
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821C (1979); Antolini, su-
pra note 1, at 759-60 ("Commentators have long criticized the tradi-
tional rule and test as unduly restrictive and illogical, barring worthy 
tort cases and preventing judicial inquiry into the merits of the plain-
tiffs' allegations of injury to the community values the tort pro-
tects."); id. at 784-86 (discussing the exception of Hawai'i). 
83. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 1335. 
84. See, e.g., California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772,28 ELR 21020 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (upholding lower court injunction and finding that the pol-
lution of subterranean percolating waters caused by the defendant's 
dumping of hazardous chemicals onto the ground at its metal tube 
manufacturing plant in Chico, California, was a public nuisance). 
85. Hoover v. Durkee, 622 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(finding that an automobile racetrack constituted a public nuisance). 
86. Union County v. Hoffman, 512 N.w.2d 168,170 (S.D. 1994) (find-
ing that a mobile home park with inadequate sewage system, accu-
mulated garbage and junk, impassable roadways, and undrinkable 
water was a public nuisance). 
87. Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 665,674-75 
(Ark. 1993) (finding that a landfill company's off-loading of rail cars 
of waste creating strong odors that disturbed nearby residents consti-
tuted a public nuisance). 
88. Tinicum Townshipv. Delaware Valley Concrete,lnc., 812 A.2d 758 
(Pa. Comm. Ct. 2002) (upholding injunction against a quarry opera-
tor's blasting operation). 
89. Crane Point Assocs. v. State, 805 So. 2d 26,27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (finding a resort's unsanitary cesspools to be a public nuisance). 
90. State v. Monoco Oil Co., 713 N.Y.S.2d 440,446 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000) (finding that fumes from asphalt storage facility that affected 
nearby residents' school, work, health, and enjoyment constituted a 
public nuisance). 
91. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051, 15 ELR 
20358 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that storage of hazardous waste on 
private property was a public nuisance claim by commercial fishers 
on Hudson River). 
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polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) leachate from solid waste 
management facility92; and PCB pollution of a river by an 
electric company, which injured and killed fish.93 
IV. Negligence: A Not So Useful Chameleon? 
Negligence is the chameleon of modem tort law, adjusting 
to virtually any factual situation involving injury to persons 
or property with its highly flexible definition and focus on 
changing social standards of conduct. Broadly defined, neg-
ligence occurs when the defendant fails to exercise the de-
gree of care required by law and engages in conduct that 
causes foreseeable harm to the plaintiff. The proposed Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm sets 
forth the primary elements of negligence: 
A person acts with negligence if the person does not ex-
ercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Pri-
mary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the per-
son's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable 
likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable se-
verity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that 
would be borne by the person and others if the person 
takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility 
of harm. 94 
Remedies for negligence include compensatory and, 
rarely, punitive damages,95 but no injunctive relief. 
Although negligence is the predominant type of tort law 
action litigated today,96 in the environmental context, it is 
not often used as a stand-alone theory. Usually, negligence is 
mentioned among a laundry list of claims or is the underly-
ing theory for other more specific causes of action, e.g., neg-
ligently caused nuisance. 97 Negligence is a key cause of ac-
tion, however, in toxic tort claims for personal injury and 
property damage.98 Despite the relatively minor use of neg-
ligence claims in the environmental injury context, there are 
several particular aspects of negligence claims that have 
special significance for environmental practitioners. 
First, on the key element of duty, an issue that can arise in 
environmental cases is whether the defendant's violation of 
a statute will control the finding of negligence. There are 
two basic kinds of statutory noncompliance situations. On 
the one hand, there may be a civil statute that expressly ad-
dresses the defendant's conduct. In this case, courts simply 
enforce the statute, as long as it is constitutional. 99 On the 
92. State v. Ferro, 592 N.Y.S.2d 516,518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
93. Leo v. General Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1989) (allowing public nuisance claim by commercial fishers on 
Hudson River). 
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM 
§3 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001). 
95. For an example of punitive damages awarded in a pollution case, see 
Tant v. Dan River, Inc., 345 S.E.2d495 (S.c. 1986) (upholdingpuni-
tive damages award in case where black sooty material from defen-
dant's boiler system contaminated plaintiffs' homes and defendant 
knew its operations violated air pollution laws). 
96. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 257 (noting that an "overwhelming number" 
of tort cases turn on negligence claim). 
97. Ravan v. Greenville County, 434 S.E.2d 296, 307 nA (S.c. Ct. 
App. 1993) ("A nuisance presupposes negligence in many in-
stances, ifnot in most, and the two torts may be coexisting and prac-
tically inseparable if the acts or omissions constituting negligence 
create a nuisance."). 
98. Ann Taylor, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of 
Tort Law, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 757 (1994). 
99. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 311. 
other hand, if a plaintiff is seeking to enforce a criminal stat-
ute, then the question is negligence per se, i.e., whether the 
defendant's violation of a criminal safety statute can be im-
ported into the torts context as the standard of care and evi-
dence ofbreach. loo Some courts apply the negligence per se 
doctrine in light of civil regulatory statutes, municipal ordi-
nances, or administrative regulations. 101 
Second, the defendant's compliance with a statute may be 
invoked as a defense. In general, defendants lose this argu-
ment. According to Dobbs: "[A ]lthough the defendant com-
plied with the statutory directives, [the trier of fact may find] 
he should have done even more to attain reasonable levels of 
safety."102 Yet, the defendant's compliance with a statute 
that "thoroughly regulates the behavior in question" may 
undermine the negligence claim. 1m 
Third, bringing a negligence claim presents some partic-
ular challenges to environmental plaintiffs because it opens 
the door to defenses that otherwise are not common in envi-
ronmental cases. Defendants have a host of affirmative de-
fenses to negligence, including contributory/comparative 
negligence, assumption of the risk (express and, in some 
states, implied), immunity, and statutes of limitation. 104 
Moreover, statutory controls on damages, such as pain and 
suffering caps and punitive damages restrictions, can under-
cut any victory secured by a successful plaintiff. Often these 
defenses or limitations are restricted to "negligence" by 
common law or statutory language and, therefore, can be 
avoided by pleading a non-negligence cause of action. 
Fourth, a subtle and related point, which arises in cases 
where plaintiffs use negligence as the underlying theory in 
a cause of action such as nuisance (as opposed to as a 
stand-alone theory), is the risk that these defenses will 
come into play when they otherwise would not, e.g., if the 
claim were based on intentional nuisance. As Prof. Bill 
Rodgers explains: 
The problem nuisance cases are those where liability is 
based upon negligence, that in the ordinary course pre-
supposes a defense of contributory negligence. Some of 
these cases, usually instances of single-incident miscon-
duct, shouldn't even be called nuisances and ought to be 
treated as conventional negligence cases .... 
An excellent example of making an easy nuisance case 
hard by introducing ideas of negligence can be found in 
the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Copart In-
dustries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. There, an auto 
servicing business claimed it was forced out of business 
because emissions from a power plant repeatedly dam-
aged the exteriors of stored automobiles. The court sus-
tained a judgment for defendant under a confused jury 
charge allowing the defense of contributory negligence 
100. Id. See, e.g., Sheila G. Bush, Can You Get There From Here?: Non-
compliance With Environmental Regulations as Negligence Per Se 
in Tort Cases, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 469 (1988/1989). 
101. Bush, supra note 100, at 47 1. See also Rodriguez v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 858 F. Supp. 127 (D. Ariz. 1994) (applying Arizona law 
and holding that there is no negligence per se for violation ofFIFRA 
where "bug bombs" ignited by pilot light destroyed mobile home). 
102. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 572. 
103. Id. 
104. See, e.g., Bradford v. State, 396 N.w.2d 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), 
vacated, 423 N.W.2d 36 (1988) (finding that in acase where the state 
facilitated site cleanup, but continued to receive shipments of 
wastes, allegations of negligence were insufficient to overcome im-
munity defense). 
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ifthe nuisance were based upon negligence. Amore con-
vincing analysis would describe this conflict as an exam-
ple of nuisance by intentional tort, with the facts clearly 
not supporting any defenses based on bargaining, such as 
consent or assumption of risk. 105 
A review of the post-1970s environmental cases involv-
ing negligence claims confirms that this highly flexible 
cause of action is, ironically, perhaps the least productive of 
all tort law theories for environmental practitioners. Courts 
often fail to analyze the negligence claim in any depth as a 
distinct part ofthe case, making analysis difficult. There are 
a few cases involving successful claims. 1 06 In a negligence 
case brought by the Oklahoma Pollution Control Coordi-
nating Board against the Kerr-McGee Corporation for 
dumping deleterious substances into the Cimarron River 
that resulted in the death of over 160,000 fish, for example, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict in fa-
vor of the state, finding that "[t]here was competent evi-
dence defendants violated the Water Quality Standards and 
also were guilty of common law negligence."107 However, 
plaintiffs also lose environmental negligence claims on the 
threshold issue of duty. 108 In short, negligence does not ap-
pear to be frequently alleged as an independent or even pri-
mary theory of the case in environmental lawsuits. When it 
is used, plaintiffs seem to have a difficult time winning. 
When negligence is used to undergird another theory, it can 
create as many difficulties for plaintiffs as it solves. Thus, 
practitioners have wisely relied on the myriad other claims 
available in environmental lawsuits. 
105. RODGERS §2.4 (PRIVATE NUISANCE), supra note 2, at 46-47 (inter-
nal footnotes omitted). 
106. See, e.g., Sterlingv. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647F. Supp. 303,311,17 
ELR 20081 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding Velsicol "guilty of common 
law negligence in the creation, implementation, operation and clo-
sure of its chemical waste burial site in Hardeman County, Tennes-
see," which was one offour tort theories that supported the compen-
satory damages totaling $5.273 million and punitive damages of 
$7.5 million), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188, 19 ELR 
20404 (6th Cir. 1988). 
107. State ex reI. Pollution Control Coordinating Bd. v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 619 P.2d 858, 864, 11 ELR 20458 (Okla. 1980). See also 
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Ozment, 434 P.2d 893 (Okla. 
1967) (allowing lessee ofland to recover from operator offactory for 
pollution of farm pond and pasture that resulted in death and damage 
to cattle). 
108. See, e.g., Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club, Inc. v. State, 128 
Wash. App. 1063 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (confirming the dismissal 
of a negligence claim in a case where plaintiffs sued the state of 
Washington when Steilacoom Lake became fouled by excessive 
aquatic growth due to the state's ban on the use of herbicidal agents 
alleging nuisance, trespass, negligence, inverse condemnation, and 
violations of the State Water Pollution Control Act; trial court dis-
missed all claims except for nuisance; the appellate court found that 
the state did not owe a special duty to the plaintiffs to take any correc-
tive action); Strand v. Neglia, 649 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1996) (finding for plaintiffs only on strict liability in a case 
where plaintiffs asserted personal injuries and property dam-
age-pled as negligence, strict liability, trespass, public and private 
nuisance, and treble damages for forcible dispossession- due to re-
lease of petroleum products from defendant's property, and conclud-
ing on negligence issue that "defendant may not be found to have 
breached a duty of care in favor of plaintiffs absent evidence of his 
actual or constructive notice of defects in the underground storage 
tanks during the period of his superintendence"); Rosenblatt v. Ex-
xon Co., 642 A.2d 180, 189 (Md. 1994) (stating that court was "un-
willing to impose upon a lessee of commercial property a duty to re-
mote successor lessees" in action by current tenant against former 
tenant, a gasoline station operator, for negligence, strict liability, 
trespass, and nuisance, seeking economic damages incurred as result 
of contamination of property by toxic chemicals during former ten-
ant's occupancy). 
V. Strict Liability-Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
Another theory that may be usefully employed to protect en-
vironmental resources is strict liability for abnormally dan-
gerous activities-a theory embraced in one form or another 
by the majority of states. 109 
The concept of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities can be traced to the 19th-century English case 
Rylands v. Fletcher. llo In Rylands, an adjoining property 
owner sued his neighbor when the neighbor's large reser-
voir of water broke through a containment wall and flooded 
the property owner's mine. The House of Lords held that the 
owner of the reservoir could be held liable, even without 
proof of negligence, because his conduct of backing up the 
river and creating the reservoir was a "non-natural" use. 
U.S. courts eventually adopted the idea that a responsible 
party may be liable, even without a showing of fault, for 
conducting certain especially dangerous activities. 
The Restatement of Torts, widely influential in shaping 
the development of state law, has adopted two different for-
mulations of strict liability. The first Restatement provided 
that strict liability would be found for "ultrahazardous activ-
ities," defined as activities that necessarily involve a risk of 
serious harm and cannot be made safe even by the exercise 
of the utmost care, and that are not a matter of common us-
ageYI The Restatement (Second) changed both the termi-
nology of activities subject to strict liability-describing 
them as abnormally dangerous activities rather than 
ultrahazardous activities-and the test for determining 
whether an activity should be so characterized. Many states 
have since adopted the formulation found in the Restate-
ment (Second). 112 
The Restatement (Second) provides that a person is liable 
for an abnormally dangerous activity that causes harm to 
persons or property, despite having exercised the "utmost 
care to prevent the harm."ll3 Thus, where the doctrine ap-
plies, reasonable care by the defendant is not a defense. 
Strict liability is limited to the type of harm that makes the 
activity abnormally dangerous in the first piaceY4 For ex-
ample, the doctrine does not extend to a product that be-
comes dangerous when used in a particular way after it is 
manufactured, but does extend to the danger inherent in an 
instrumentality/product at all times. 115 
As is clear from the above formulation, unlike nuisance 
or trespass, to prevail on an abnormally dangerous activity 
strict liability theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual 
personal injury or property damage. However, while nui-
sance theory requires that defendant's activities continually 
interfere with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of 
land, strict liability can apply to ongoing as well as past ac-
tivities by a defendant. 
109. DANIEL SELMI & KENNETH MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW §4.5, at 4-16 (2005). For a detailed discussion, see Alexandra 
Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on 
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 903 (2004). 
110. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). 
111. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §520 (1938). 
112. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 954. 
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §519 (1977). 
114. Id. 
115. Traube v. Freund, 775 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
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Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) lists six factors 
that courts should consider in determining whether an activ-
ity is "abnormally dangerous": 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to 
the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will 
be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of rea-
sonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of com-
mon usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where 
it is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is out-
weighed by its dangerous attributes. 116 
These factors incorporate a type of risk-benefit analysis, 
comparable in some ways to a negligence analysis. There is 
no set formula for weighing these factors; rather, the courts 
evaluate them on a case-by-case basis, examining the char-
acteristics of the activity as conducted in a particular in-
stance and location. 117 
The leading case concerning abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity, strict liability, and environmental contamination is 
State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron 
Corp.,ll8 a 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court decision. Ap-
plying the Restatement factors, the court found that various 
owners of a mercury processing plant, who had disposed of 
mercury waste that contaminated a tidal creek, were strictly 
liable for the cleanup and removal of the mercury. While 
other cases similarly have imposed strict liability for chemi-
cal contamination resulting from industrial activities, such 
as leaking gas tanks and oil wells, the case law in these cir-
cumstances is not uniform. 119 As demonstrated in a recent 
analysis by Prof. Alexandra Klass, however, the trend in 
most jurisdictions appears to be toward extending the doc-
trine of strict liability to activities resulting in environmen-
tal contamination. 120 
One critical factor in these cases is whether the activity 
can be made safe through the exercise of reasonable care. 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1977). 
117. See id. §520 cmt. f. 
118. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
119. Cases imposing strict liability include Prospect Indus. Corp. v. 
Singer Co., 569 A.2d 908,910 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (dis-
posal of PCBs at manufacturing plant); Branch v Western Petro-
leum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 13 ELR 20362 (Utah 1982) (waste water 
from oil wells); Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. 1998) 
(leaking underground storage tanks); Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 
A.2d 138 (Md. 1969) (leaking underground storage tanks). Some 
cases to the contrary include Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. 
Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1252 (D. Conn. 1992) (storage and han-
dling of hazardous substances at facility that overhauls and services 
jet planes); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 
1992) (release of vapors from the storage of hydrochloric and sulfu-
ric acid from chemical plant); Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 129 
F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (leaks from underground 
oil pipeline); Grube v. Daun, 570 N.w.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997) 
(leaking underground storage tanks). See also Klass, supra note 109, 
at 937 n.140 (listing cases pro and con involving releases of petro-
leum and natural gas), 940-58 (describing cases in which courts 
found strict liability for environmental contamination). 
120. Klass, supra note 109, at 957-58. Professor Klass argues that for 
many courts, a significant justification for doing so is the existence 
of federal and state statutes imposing strict liability for the release of 
hazardous substances, most notably the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Id. 
at 942-57. 
Thus, for instance, some courts have held that the handling 
or transportation of hazardous substances are not abnor-
mally dangerous activities because the risks involved can be 
eliminated through the exercise of due care. 121 A number of 
commentators have noted that this is the single most diffi-
cult criterion for plaintiffs to satisfy.122 Another important 
consideration is how the activity in question is characterized 
by the courts; as Professor Dobbs notes, this "foreordains 
the outcome because, depending on how you describe the 
activity, it mayor may not seem to be abnormally dangerous 
or uncommon."123 For example, if a court focuses on the 
general handling, use, or manufacture of a toxic chemical, it 
is more apt to find the activity is commonplace; if it empha-
sizes the particular circumstances under which a specific 
defendant has used, handled, or disposed of the chemical, 
i.e., in unsafe tanks or in a landfill, it will be more inclined to 
find that it is uncommon. 124 In one New Jersey case, the de-
fendant's die-casting machines required the use ofhydraulic 
fluid, containing high levels of PCBs, and the fluid con-
stantly spilled from the machines. The court characterized 
the activity in question not as the defendant's manufacturing 
process, but as the leakage of hydraulic fluids from the ma-
chinery, concluding that it was an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity.125 On the other hand, a number of courts have found 
that leaks from gas tanks are commonplace rather than ab-
normally dangerous activities. 126 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has extended the strict li-
ability doctrine to include predecessor owners to title who 
were responsible for the contamination. 127 In 1991, the court 
ruled that the policy rationales underlying the doc-
trine-that those who engage in dangerous and inappropri-
ate activities should bear the risks of harm associated with it, 
and that such enterprises can more easily bear the costs of 
administering such risks by passing them onto the pub-
lic-are not limited to situations where the plaintiff and de-
fendant are neighboring landowners. 128 The majority of 
other courts, however, have refused to allow landowners to 
bring strict liability claims against prior owners of their 
property. For example, in Futura Realty v. Lone Star Build-
ing Centers,129 a Florida court held that the strict liability 
doctrine covered only harms to neighboring land, and that a 
seller had no duty for damage to its land as it related to the 
land's sale because the buyer can protect itself in other 
ways, including "careful inspection and negotiation."130 
121. Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., 766 F.2d 904, 907 (5th Cir. 1985). 
122. See Klass, supra note 109, at 916 & n.52 (citing commentary). 
123. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 967. 
124. SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 109, §4.7, at 4-21 to 4-22. 
125. Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 569 A.2d 908,910 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 1989). 
126. Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 
392D(ED. Va. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff s characterization ofthe ac-
tivity as "storage of gasoline in moribund underground tanks" be-
cause that is not the normal condition ofthe tanks) (emphasis in orig-
inal); see also Grube v. Duan, 570 N.W.2d 851,857 (Wis. 1997) 
("[W]e reject the plaintiffs' assertion that the leakage and resulting 
contamination attributable to [an] UST is the appropriate activity to 
be analyzed under the Restatement. The contamination is the result-
ing harm, not the alleged ultrahazardous activity itself."). 
127. T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991). 
128. Id. at 1257. 
129. 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
130. Id. at 365. See also Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 
731 (8th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Minnesota law and listing cases 
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On a final note, the American Law Institute's Tentative 
Draft No.1 ofthe Restatement (Third) of Torts, published in 
2001, would simplifY the six-part test of the Restatement 
(Second). It defines an abnormally dangerous activity as one 
that creates "a foreseeable and highly significant risk of 
physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised" and 
that is not a matter of common usage. 131 The draft Restate-
ment includes, as an illustration of a potentially abnormally 
dangerous activity, the storage and airborne release to the 
surrounding community of a toxic chemical byproduct gen-
erated by a computer manufacturer located in a residential 
community. 132 If adopted, this revised standard could make 
it easier for plaintiffs to prevail in abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity cases, particularly by eliminating the inquiry into the 
relative value ofthe underlying activity called for by the Re-
statement (Second). 
VI. Products Liability 
A related branch of tort law is products liability (dealing 
with products rather than activities), which permits the 
award of damages from manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts that injure persons or property. Although largely devel-
oped outside the context of environmental law, creative 
practitioners are now using this theory to recover against the 
manufacturers of products that cause environmental dam-
age. An excellent example of a "new wave" strict liability 
case is the successful litigation brought by the South Lake 
Tahoe Water District against the manufacturers of the gas-
oline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). More-
over, in response to the unique product identification prob-
lems posed in cases involving MTBE contamination, at 
least one court has developed a modified form of market 
share liability known as "commingled product market 
share liability."133 
There are a number of theories under which product lia-
bility claims may be brought, including negligence, breach 
of warranty, and strict liability. Negligence requires the 
plaintiff to show defendant's failure to comply with a stan-
dard of care. Breach of warranty requires privity between 
plaintiff and defendant, and in some instances a seller may 
be able to limit or disclaim a warranty entirely. Strict liabil-
ity is the most plaintiff-friendly theory. In contrast to the 
other approaches, it focuses on the condition of the product 
itself, not the fault of the defendant. The remainder of this 
section discusses strict liability theory. 
In general, the Restatement of Torts provides that sellers 
are strictly liable for personal or property damage caused by 
any product "in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous" to the user or consumer of the product. Liability atta-
ches even if the seller has exercised all possible care, and 
even if there is no privity between the injured party and 
seller or manufacturer. The defendant must be an ordinary 
seller of the product in question, and the product must reach 
the plaintiff without substantial change. There are three 
from other jurisdictions that have reached similar results); Klass, su-
pra note 109, at 938 n.142 (listing cases pro and con). 
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM 
§20 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001). 
132. Id. cmt. k, illus. 2. 
133. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 377-79 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 F.3d 
112 (2d Cir. 2007). 
ways in which a product may be defective: a design defect; a 
defect due to a flaw in the manufacturing process; or a defect 
in the product warnings or instructions for use. 134 
A manufacturing defect refers to a product that was pro-
duced out of conformity with the manufacturer's intended 
design. 135 A design defect occurs when the intended product 
line itself is defective. In design defect cases, two tests have 
been used to determine whether a product is unreasonably 
dangerous. One is the "consumer expectation test," which 
examines if the article sold is "dangerous to an extent be-
yond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics."136 The 
other test, favored increasingly by courts in recent years and 
advocated by the 1998 Product Liability Restatement, is the 
risk-utility test. This test evaluates whether the product's 
dangers outweigh its benefits, with an emphasis on whether 
alternatives were available that would have eliminated the 
risks of the product. 137 A product may also be defective if it 
does not include adequate warnings about its dangers or in-
structions needed for safe use (failure to warn is also some-
times treated as a separate theory of liability). 
There are a number of important defenses to product lia-
bility claims. One is the so-called state-of-the-art-de-
fense-where a defendant claims that it did not know, and 
could not reasonably have known, the hazards of the product 
at the time that the plaintiff was exposed to it.138 Some 
courts have refused to allow this defense, arguing that it im-
properly injects negligence elements into the strict liability 
case by focusing on defendant's fault at the time of a prod-
uct's manufacture, but this is a minority view. 139 
Likewise, sellers are liable only for the foreseeable uses 
of their products. In the environmental context, some courts 
have found that the ultimate method of disposal of products 
containing toxic substances or the recycling or dismantling 
of such products is not reasonably foreseeable. 140 On the 
other hand, in the recent wave of MTBE litigation, courts 
have found that groundwater contamination was a foresee-
able result of the defendants' production of gasoline con-
taining MTBE. In the multidistrict federal MTBE litigation, 
for example, the court concluded that "[d]efendants were 
aware that mixing MTBE with gasoline would result in mas-
sive groundwater contamination. They knew that there was 
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY §2 (1998). 
135. In the environmental context, this could, for example, involve a situ-
ation in which contaminants are inadvertently introduced into a 
product. Duane Miller, Toxic Torts and Environmental Litigation, in 
KENNETH MANASTER & DANIEL SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE §3.02, at 3-6 (2005). 
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. i (1965). 
137. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 985-87, 996-97. 
138. See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp, 53 Cal. 3d 987 
(Cal. 1991) (upholding state-of-the-art defense in strict product lia-
bility action based upon failure to warn). 
139. See Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 282 Mont. 168 (Mont. 1997) (rejecting 
state-of-the-art defense in strict product liability actions generally). 
140. See United States v. Union Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 478 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (finding that discharge of PCBs from electrical transformers 
and capacitors drained to salvage various metal parts, after they were 
used by consumers for twenty to thirty years, was not an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable use of the product); Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631,17 ELR 20879 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding 
that use of junk electrical components containing PCBs that alleged 
resulted in injuries to plaintiffs was not reasonably foreseeable use to 
manufacturer of new electrical components). 
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a national crisis involving gasoline leaking from multiple 
sources, such as underground storage tanks, and that gaso-
line enters the soil from gas stations due to consumer and 
jobber overfills.,,141 
Courts also have recognized a "sophisticated user" de-
fense, which provides that a manufacturer's duty to warn 
can be satisfied by providing information about a product's 
risks to a third party upon whom it can reasonably rely to 
communicate the information to the end user ofthe product. 
This defense, for instance, has been successfully applied 
where bulk suppliers of chemicals are sold to knowledge-
able intermediaries. 142 
Also, certain products that cannot be made completely 
safe for their intended and ordinary use may be designated 
as "unavoidably unsafe" (the classic examples are guns or 
knives). Under the Restatement, an unavoidably unsafe 
product is not considered defective or unreasonably ~anger­
ous where its usefulness outweighs the dangers of Its use, 
provided that the product includes sufficient instructions 
and warnings. 143 This defense, however, is not likely to arise 
often in the environmental context. 
Having canvassed the most commonly used tort ap-
proaches, we now tum to an old, yet potent, resource protec-
tion theory-the public trust doctrine. 
VII. Public Trust-Modern Revival of Ancient Arts 
The venerable public trust doctrine is another ancient com-
mon law theory that has been increasingly used, with some 
significant success, since the 1970s to achieve environmen-
tal conservation goals. Prof. Joseph Sax is widely recog-
nized as the catalyst for the modem-day revival of the pub-
lic trust doctrine through his landmark 1970 article: The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention. 144 While not easy to define, the doc-
trine generally holds that certain natural resources are held 
by the government in special status, that the government 
may neither alienate those resources nor permit private 
parties to injure them, and that the government has an ongo-
ing, affirmative duty to safeguard those resources for the 
benefit of the public. 145 
As Professor Sax explained more recently: 
The public trust is of special importance, as the states 
have expressly recognized, because it invokes not just 
authority but a duty on the part of government to protect 
public rights. Agencies of the state have an affirmative 
obligation to come forward and to take on the burden of 
asserting and implementing the public trust. Moreover, 
the public trust is a continuing obligation. In trust waters 
there can be no such thing as a permanent, once-and-for-
all allocation of trust waters or land. That principle is es-
sential to acknowledge government responsibilities to 
141. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348,365 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
142. See Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2 (1998). 
144. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
145. Richard Frank, Public Trust Doctrine, in CALIFORNIA ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE, supra note 135, §2.02, at 
2-4 to 2-5. 
respond to changing public needs and changing roles for 
water in the economy. 146 
The American origins of the public trust doctrine can be 
traced to an 1821 New Jersey case 147 and the more famous 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois. 148 The basic tenet of the doctrine is that "the 
land underlying navigable waters could never be privatized 
to the detriment of fundamental public rights in the lands 
and in the water overlying them. The trust is old, but its ap-
plication to water diversions and to environmental protec-
tion is new.,,149 
The public trust doctrine received its major modem en-
dorsement in the landmark California National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County150 decision in 
1983. This case, which involved the diversion of water for 
the city of Los Angeles from the Sierra Nevada streams that 
fed Mono Lake, expressly applied the public trust doctrine 
to limit stream diversions that were harming the environ-
ment. The court found that in administering the public trust, 
"[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust 
into account ... and to protect public trust uses whenever 
feasible."151 Shortly thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court 
followed Mono Lake in principle, finding that even though 
a state agency's permit to a yacht club for construction of 
slips on Lake Coeur d'Alene did not violate the public 
trust, "the state is not precluded from determining in the fu-
ture that the conveyance is no longer compatible with the 
public truSt."152 
In 2000, the public trust doctrine reached what is perhaps 
its broadest application, in Hawai'i through the "Waiiihole" 
water rights case. 153 As they explain, in the Waiiihole case, 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized a newly defined and 
expansive "state water resources trust." 154 Based on Hawai-
ian law, the court concluded that this public trust extended to 
"all water resources without exception or distinction."155 
Under the trust, the state has a "duty to promote the reason-
146. Joseph Sax, Presentation, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on 
Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctnne, U. HAw.. L. REV., Wm-
ter 2001, at 21,31, available at http://www.hawall.edu/uhrevlew/ 
publictrust.pdf. 
147. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1 (1821). 
148. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
149. Sax, supra note 146, at 28. 
150. 658 P.2d 709, 13 ELR 20272 (Cal. 1983) (commonly referred to as 
the "Mono Lake" case) [hereinafter Mono Lake]. See also the earlier 
landmark case of Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 2 ELR 20049 
(Cal. 1971). 
151. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728 (emphasis added). 
152. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 
P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983). See also Mineral County v. Nevada, 
20 P.3d 800, 807-09 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, 1., concurring) (affirming 
the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in Nevada). 
153. In re Waiahole Ditch Combined Contested Case Hearing, 94 Haw. 
97 (Haw. 2000), appeal after remand, 105 Haw. 1 (Haw. 2004) 
[hereinafter Waiilhole]. See D. Kapua'ala Sproat & Isaac H. 
Moriwake, Ke Kala Pa'a 0 Waiilhole: Use of the Publzc Trust as a 
Tool for Environmental Advocacy, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW 
STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 39, at 
247. 
154. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§445, 451 (2005). 
155. Id. at 445-47. The Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized the traditional 
public trust uses of "navigation, commerce, a~~ fishing," as well as 
the more modern recreational uses such as batillng, sWlmnung, 
boating, and scenic viewing." Id. at 448. The court also recognized 
"domestic uses, particularly drinking" and "Native Hawallan and 
traditional and customary rights" as public trust uses. Id. at 449. 
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able and beneficial use of water resources in order to maxi-
mize their social and economic benefits to the people ofthis 
state,"156 which includes waters "in their natural state"157 
and includes an additional duty to protect traditional and 
customary rights of Native Hawaiians. 158 According to the 
court, this means that "the [Water] Commission must not 
relegate itselfto the role of a mere 'umpire passively calling 
balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it,' but in-
stead must take the initiative in considering, protecting, and 
advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the 
planning and decisionmaking process."159 
The ultimate result of the application of the public trust 
doctrine in the Waiiihole case was the first-ever restoration 
of streams in the history ofHawai'i. For over 100 years, ma-
jor sugar cane operations had diverted water from streams 
and small farmers on the windward side of O'ahu (as on 
other islands), decimating native stream life and the long 
tradition ofkalo (taro) farming by native Hawaiians and oth-
ers. As Sproat and Moriwake conclude: 
The public trust's limitation on alienation, therefore, did 
not directly control the water allocation decisions in 
Waiiihole. Nonetheless, the state's enduring public trust 
interest in water resources laid the foundation for the 
entire case, validating the Commission's authority to 
make its allocation decisions and the windward com-
munity's call for stream restoration notwithstanding 
existing diversions. 160 
Thus, even while the Waiiihole case continues today to be 
tangled up in administrative hearings, appeals, and re-
mands, the decision should embolden environmental advo-
cates' consideration of the public trust doctrine as an advo-
cacy tool. 
While the public trust doctrine is historically associated 
with tidal and navigable waters, it has been applied to nu-
merous other public natural resources, including fish and 
wildlife, habitat, and recreational resources. 161 In New Jer-
sey and Connecticut, the courts have focused attention on 
beach access, recognizing the vastly increased importance 
of recreational use of water in modem times. 162 Another 
case, in Wisconsin, found that a conveyance of lakeside 
docks to private owners violated the public truSt. 163 Simi-
larly, in Vermont, a railroad's attempt in 1989 to claim litto-
ral title to land used for the construction of wharves 140 
years earlier, in 1849, was rejected on the basis of the endur-
156. Id. at 451. 
157. Id. at 452. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 455. 
160. See Sproat, supra note 153. 
161. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 2ELR20049 (Cal. 1971); 
State v. Superior Court of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256, 11 ELR 
20483 (Cal. 1981) (protecting ecology and scenic beauty of 
"shorezone" of Lake Tahoe under public trust doctrine). 
162. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 
47,2 ELR 20519 (N.J. 1972); Leyden v. Town of Greenwich, 777 
A.2d 552,564 n.17 (Conn. 2001) ("public trust doctrine ... is a well 
established part of our common law and ... applies both to privately 
and publicly owned shorefront property"). 
163. ABKA Ltd. Partnership v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 
635 N.w.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting public marina's 
conveyance of docks for "dockominiums" as violating the state 
public trust, which overlays riparian owners rights to reasonable 
use of lake). 
ing public trust. 164 Thus, practitioners should also think 
about the public trust doctrine more broadly than just in the 
context of traditional water law. 
VIII. The Problem of Preemption 
A final key issue in any examination of the viability of a 
common law remedy is whether the post-1970s federal stat-
utory scheme has preempted the common law claim. Defen-
dants often seek to mount preemption defenses to common 
law claims. In general, claims based on federal common law 
involving areas directly addressed by federal statutes are 
likely to be preempted. By contrast, if a claim is based on 
state common law, preemption by either federal or state stat-
utes is far less likely, primarily because of "savings" clauses 
in the statutes that preserve these supplemental remedies. 165 
The leading case involving federal common law preemp-
tion is the 1981 Court decision, Milwaukee v. Illinois (Mil-
waukee II). 166 There the Court found that federal common 
law nuisance claims for water pollution were preempted by 
the Clean Water Act's (CWA's) establishment ofa compre-
hensive regulatory program governing water discharges. 167 
Six years later, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 168 
the Court held that the CWA also preempted state common 
law nuisance claims for trans-state water pollution brought 
under the law of the receiving state. However, Ouellette and 
other post-Milwaukee II cases made clear that state common 
law claims based on the law of the "source state" were pre-
served as a viable remedy. 169 
Thus, if a federal legislative scheme directly addresses an 
issue-for example if a permit has been issued pursuant to 
federal law governing the polluting activity-federal com-
mon law claims will be preempted. 170 On the other hand, if 
federal regulation does not directly address a polluting ac-
tivity, such as nonpoint water pollution or carbon dioxide 
emissions contributing to global warming, federal common 
law claims arguably are not preempted. 171 
As noted above, the courts generally have allowed state 
common law claims to continue as a viable remedy despite 
164. State v. Central Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). 
165. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.c. 
§1365(e) (2005); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. §7604(e) (2005). 
166. 451 U.S. 304, 11 ELR20406 (1981). See Middlesex County Sewer-
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,21-22, 11 
ELR 20684 (1981) (reiterating that the CW A completely preempted 
the federal common law of nuisance for water pollution). 
167. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 304. 
168. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
169. In Ouellette, Vermont property owners claimed that the pollution 
discharged into Lake Champlain by a paper company located in New 
York constituted a nuisance under Vermont law. The Court held that 
the FWPCA taken "as a whole, its purposes and its history" pre-
empted an action based on the law of the affected State and that the 
only state law applicable to an interstate discharge is "the law ofthe 
State in which the point source is located." Id. at 493,487. 
170. See, e.g., Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 23 ELR 20361 
(1st Cir. 1992) (finding that Safe Drinking Water Act preempts fed-
eral common law of nuisance with respect to claims for injuries al-
legedly caused by drinking water supplied by a city); United States 
v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 12 ELR 20459 (D.N.J. 1982) 
(finding that where a utility was granted a variance by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to burn fuel with a sulfur content 
higher than that allowed by the Clean Air Act, a federal common law 
nuisance claim seeking an equitable remedy proscribing the permit-
ted conduct is barred). 
171. See New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2, 11 
ELR 20888 (2d Cir. 1981). See Pawa, supra note 80. 
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the federal and state statutory schemes in place to address 
the same issues. 172 The determination ofwhether state com-
mon law claims are preempted also is statute-specific, de-
pending on legislative intent and the particular language 
used in the relevant statute. 
In its most recent environmental law preemption case, 
Bates v. Dow Agroscience, Ltd. Liability Co. 173 the Court de-
cisively rejected arguments for broad preemption of state 
common law claims. The Court interpreted narrowly the 
preemption provision in the Federal, Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide (FIFRA) labeling clause and held that state 
common law claims for strict or negligent product liability, 
breach of warranty, and others were not preempted by 
FIFRA. The Court rejected the view of numerous circuit 
courts and state appellate courts that such claims were pre-
empted on the theory that if successful, they would likely in-
duce manufacturers to change their labels. The Court reiter-
ated its historic presumption against preempting state law in 
areas of traditional state regulation absent clear and mani-
fest congressional intent to do so. It explained that if there 
are two equally plausible interpretations of a preemption 
clause, the Court must follow the reading that disfavors pre-
emption. 174 The Court further embraced the positive, com-
plementary role that tort litigation can play alongside fed-
eral environmental statutes, noting that it can serve as a cata-
172. See, e.g., Biddix v. HenredonFurniture Indus., Inc., 331 S.E.2d 717, 
725 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that common law suit for private 
nuisance and trespass was not preempted under the FWPCA and 
North Carolina water pollution control statute where furniture com-
pany's upstream discharge of hazardous and toxic chemicals and 
substances in stream adversely affected plaintiff s property); 
Sullivan v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 627, 633 
(S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding state common law nuisance claims 
against in-state sources were not preempted by the CWA); Idaho v. 
Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 833-34, 35 ELR 20087 (D. 
Idaho 1997), aff'd, 882 F.2d 392, 19 ELR 21358 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(finding that Idaho's state Environmental Protection and Health Act 
did not preempt the state's common law nuisance action against the 
current owners of a mine for water pollution caused by historical 
mining operations). 
173. 125 S. Ct. 1788, 35 ELR 20087 (2005). 
174. Id. at 1801. 
lyst for improving the safety of pesticide labels and further-
ing the underlying goals of federal pesticide law. 175 
Particularly in the area of federal common law, however, 
the precise contours of the preemption doctrine in environ-
mental law are still unfolding. In the context of the Clean 
Air Act, the preemption issue is likely to be pressed all the 
way to the Court either in the New York global warming 
case mentioned above or a similar action filed by Califor-
nia against the six largest automakers operating in the 
United States. 176 
In short, preemption is not a full bar to common law reme-
dies. While practitioners must carefully examine potential 
overlap between their common law claims and statutory 
law, there is still significant opportunity for arguing that 
these are complementary and not competing remedies. 
IX. Conclusion 
As this overview suggests, the environmental common law 
provides many promising avenues for enterprising practi-
tioners. Despite the advent of modem environmental stat-
utes in the 1970s, most common law remedies remain viable 
and vital, and have been used with significant success over 
the past three decades. There is no better way to understand 
the common law's potency, however, than to observe it in 
action, as we think will become clear by reading the compel-
ling case studies in Chapters 5 through 13 of Creative Com-
mon Law Strategies for Protecting the Environment. 
175. Id. at 1802; see Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children's Health 
Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
89 (2005) (noting significant opening provided by Bates decision for 
common law claims involving pesticides and children's health). 
176. California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871,37 ELR 
20239 (N.D. Cal.) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss). An-
other nuisance action likely raising preemption issues under the 
CAA was filed in 2006 by the Attorney General of North Carolina 
against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), seeking to force re-
ductions in emissions from TV A's operations in North Carolina and 
other states. See Editorial, New Strategy on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 4, 2006, at 12, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ2006/ 
03/04/opinion/04sat3.html. See Kenneth P. Alex, California's 
Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in CREATIVE 
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 39, at 165. 
